William Hasker, PROVIDENCE, EVIL AND THE OPENNESS OF GOD by Morris, Dolores G.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 25 Issue 3 Article 14 
7-1-2008 
Hasker, PROVIDENCE, EVIL, AND THE OPENNESS OF GOD 
Dolores G. Morris 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Morris, Dolores G. (2008) "Hasker, PROVIDENCE, EVIL, AND THE OPENNESS OF GOD," Faith and 
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 25 : Iss. 3 , Article 14. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol25/iss3/14 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
350 Faith and Philosophy
It is also worth noting that on the intermediate embodiment view a "res­
urrection" is the glorification of an already existing and living body. In 
no sense is it a rising from the grave. This is ironic given Corcoran's sug­
gestion that contemporary dualists have neglected or misunderstood the 
meaning of 'resurrection.'
One of the principal ideas of the chapter is that the biblical case for du­
alism is not as straightforward as it is sometimes assumed. That is a point 
well worth making. Though a dualist interpretation can be defended, the 
anthropological teaching of the text (if any) is not entirely explicit. But it 
is also true that the materialist alternatives, and the intermediate embodi­
ment view in particular, face some serious challenges.
Overall, Rethinking H um an N ature is an excellent entry to current Chris­
tian reflection on the relation between mind and body, as well as the sur­
rounding ethical and theological issues. It engages the reader, succinctly 
covers a wide range of arguments, and exemplifies thoughtful and care­
ful reflection from a thoroughly Christian perspective. Corcoran does not 
pretend that all readers will be convinced by the case for the constitution 
view, but he offers his audience an appealing invitation to take it serious­
ly. For many students and non-specialists, Rethinking H um an N ature will 
be the best available introduction to an important facet of contemporary 
thinking on mind and body.
Providence, Evil and the Openness o f  God, by William Hasker. Routledge, 
2004. Pp. 224. $130 (hardback).
DOLORES G. MORRIS, University of Notre Dame
"How does God run the world?" How can we account for "the prevalence 
of evil in a world supposedly governed by a God who is wise, good, and 
powerful?" (p. 1) In Providence, Evil and the Openness o f  God, William Hasker 
offers a series of reflections based largely upon these questions. Each chap­
ter of this volume is a stand-alone essay, though all are united by one cen­
tral theme: the superiority of open theism over rival conceptions of divine 
providence with respect to both the problem of evil and the existence of 
libertarian free will.
This volume is divided into two parts. The five essays in Part One com­
prise a discussion of the problem of evil; these essays deal very little with 
the differences among competing accounts of divine providence, but focus 
instead on the beliefs shared by most traditional theists. Hasker spends al­
most no time on the logical problem of evil, referring the reader to Alvin 
Plantinga's Free-Will Defense. Instead, the focus here is on the evidential 
problem of evil, "the version which claims that God's existence is improb­
able given the evidence of evil." (p. 24)
Prior to the discussion of the evidential problem, however, is an essay 
pertaining to the existential problem of evil. This version of the problem is 
articulated in the form of moral protest against a God who would create a 
world in which suffering is prevalent. In chapter one, "On regretting the
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evils of this world," Hasker argues that few people, theists or atheists, 
could consistently raise such a protest.
In this fascinating, carefully argued essay, Hasker explicates our no­
tions of "gladness" and "regret" into what he calls a "logic of preference." 
He distinguishes circum stantial gladness, where you are glad about some 
state of affairs P  but regret some Q  which you know to be necessary for P, 
from being glad on the w hole. He defines the latter as follows:
'A is glad on the whole that P' =df 'A is glad that P, and for any state- 
of-affairs Q  such that A knows that if Q  did not obtain neither would 
P, A is glad that Q.' (p. 14)1
Armed with this distinction, Hasker goes on to note the massive historic 
contingency of the existence of any given person.2 Assuming with Kripke 
that "personal identity requires an identical genetic heritage," any signifi­
cant change in our history is likely to have resulted in a very different 
population (p. 11).3 Thus, if I am glad on the w hole about my own existence, 
or about the existence of those that I love, then I must be glad about the 
history of the world having been as it has (p. 15). But I cannot consistently 
complain  about that which I am glad  about! Therefore, Hasker concludes,
If I am glad on the whole about my own existence, and that of per­
sons close to me, then I cannot reproach God for the general character 
or the major events of the world's past history. (p. 19)
This is, of course, to say that I cannot consistently raise the existential 
problem of evil.
I believe that Hasker is right about this; if I am glad on the whole of my 
own existence, then I cannot consistently complain about any of the atroci­
ties which may have been necessary for my own coming-into-existence.4 
The trouble, as they say, is that one man's m odus ponens is another's modus 
tollens. Hasker takes this argument to preclude most of us (the atheolo- 
gian included) from raising the existential problem of evil. As I see it, the 
argument demonstrates that very few of us can be glad on the whole of 
our own existence.5 Consider in particular the atheologian who wishes to 
raise the existential problem of evil. Will he conclude, with Hasker, that 
he must prefer the Holocaust, the early American slave-trade, the influ­
enza pandemics, and whatever else might be necessary for his own exis- 
tence—simply because he is glad on the whole about his own existence?6 
I think that he will not. Instead, he will likely conclude that he can be 
at best circum stantially  glad about his own existence. But circumstantial 
gladness does not require that he be glad about the circumstances neces­
sary for his own existence, and so the atheologian will remain perfectly 
capable of raising the existential problem of evil without running the risk 
of inconsistency.
The remaining chapters in part one address the evidential problem of evil. 
Central to the discussion is Hasker's claim that a wholly good God, contrary 
to traditional theistic belief, could and should  allow for the existence of evil 
that is genuinely gratuitous. In chapter two, "Suffering, soul-making and 
salvation," Hasker offers what he takes to be the most promising theodicy
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in light of the evidential problem of evil. This chapter also includes a dis­
cussion of theodicy in general, as well as a critical evaluation of Eleonore 
Stump's theodicy of "suffering for redemption"(p. 23).7 Ultimately, Hasker 
concludes that a variant of John Hick's soul-making theodicy is "an ad­
equate solution for the problem of inflicted moral and natural evil"(p. 40).8 
Chapter three, "The sceptical solution of the problem of evil," focuses on 
a particular theistic response to William Rowe's famous formulation of the 
evidential problem of evil.9 Here Hasker, drawing on the work of Richard 
Swinburne, emphasizes the danger of appealing to our epistemic limita­
tions in order to deny the existence of gratuitous evil.10 Instead, he suggests 
that the theist reconsider her support for the following premise:
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence 
of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without 
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally 
bad or worse. (p. 43)
In rejecting this premise, and accepting the fact that God might allow gra­
tuitous evils to occur, the theist is free to reject the conclusion of Rowe's 
evidential argument from evil.
The two succeeding chapters continue this theme. Chapter four ("The 
necessity of gratuitous evil") offers an argument for the claim that God 
must not prevent the occurrence of all such evils if His creatures are to be 
endowed with libertarian freedom. Chapter five, "Can God permit 'just 
enough' evil?" furthers this point, concluding that "theists should reject 
the idea that God must prevent all gratuitous evil" (p. 91).
In part two, the focus shifts to competing accounts of divine provi­
dence. Here, Hasker considers the relative impact of atheistic arguments 
from evil upon each of these accounts. The bulk of the discussion con­
cerns Molinism, Theological Determinism, and Open Theism, but Process 
Theism is addressed here as well. In chapter six, "The openness of God," 
Hasker offers a broad presentation of the "open" view of God. Beginning 
with a brief account of his own conversion to open theism, he details the 
basic commitments of this "risk-taking" conception of God and addresses 
some of the more common objections to this position.
In chapters seven and eight, Hasker compares Open Theism both to Mo- 
linism and to Theological Determinism. Chapter seven, "Providence and 
Evil," is an evaluation of each theory in light of two features: their ability to 
ground an adequate theodicy for the evidential problem of evil, and their 
ability to make sense of genuine divine-human dialogue. Here Hasker con­
cludes that Open Theism is in the best position with respect to both of 
these tasks. In chapter eight, "The God who takes risks," Hasker further 
advances the position that open theism offers the most promising account 
of divine providence available to Christian theists. He maintains that the 
risk-taking nature ascribed to God on such an account, often assumed to 
be a liability of open theism, is in fact a benefit, for it enables the open theist 
both to do justice to the emotional language attributed to God in scripture 
and to avoid the "dark paradoxes of theological determinism" (p. 134).
In chapter nine, "The problem of evil in process theism and classical 
free-will theism," the discussion broadens to include process theism.
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Here, Hasker considers the claim that process theism is better equipped to 
handle the problem of evil than are the more traditional theistic accounts 
of providence, and concludes that open theism—unlike Molinism and 
Theological Determinism—possesses no disadvantage in this regard.
In chapter ten, "antinomies of divine providence," the focus returns to 
the three primary accounts of divine providence. Central to this chapter is 
the apparent tension between divine sovereignty and creaturely freedom, 
though a version of the Grounding Objection to Molinism is raised here as 
well. Finally, in chapter eleven, Hasker considers the traditional Christian 
belief that God is perfectly good in light of the (equally traditional) belief 
that creation was a free act of God. Much of this discussion centers upon a 
recent dialogue between William Rowe and Thomas Morris.11 Taking this 
dialogue as his starting point, Hasker suggests that Christians re-evaluate 
their conception of God's goodness. By emphasizing "the intrinsic excel­
lence of his holy and gracious love," Hasker believes that the apparent 
constraints imposed upon God's freedom by His goodness can be shown 
to be illusory (p. 184).
This book concludes with an appendix entitled "Replies to My Critics." 
The appendix begins with a continuation of Hasker's arguments against 
both Molinism and the "simple foreknowledge" account of providence. 
The bulk of the appendix, however, consists of a defense of open theism 
against recently formulated objections.
Throughout part two of this volume, Hasker's rejection of Molinism 
plays a central role in advancing the position that Open Theism offers the 
best account of providence available to the traditional Christian theist.12 At 
the heart of Hasker's rejection of Molinism is the Grounding Objection.13 In 
response to this objection, Hasker writes, "Some Molinists have counterat­
tacked, claiming that the grounding objection is without force because the 
requirement for grounding has not been given a precise enough formula­
tion" (p. 194). For this reason, in the appendix, Hasker offers a precise for­
mulation of the grounding requirement. I would like, briefly, to evaluate 
Hasker's grounding requirement, and to provide a defense of Molinism in 
light of Hasker's proposal.
Hasker begins by defining a "concrete state or event" as "the exem plifi­
cation o f  an occurrent property by a substance at a time, or o f  an occurrent rela­
tion by two or m ore substances at a time" (p. 195). His proposed grounding 
principle, then, is as follows:
(GP) A ny true contingent proposition is true in virtue o f  the existence or non­
existence o f  som e concrete state or event. (p. 195)
Hasker follows his grounding principle with a few clarifying comments, 
not all of which are relevant for our purposes.14 One comment that I deem 
crucial to the discussion is as follows. Hasker asks,
Why must we allow grounding to consist in the non-existence of a 
state or event? The answer is that "non-existence" needs to be in­
cluded in order to account for negative and universal propositions. 
The truth of "All crows are black" depends on the non-existence of 
crows which are not black. (p. 195)15
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He continues,
The fundamental idea behind this requirement is that contingent 
propositions are descriptive of the actual state of the world; in order 
for such a proposition to be true, the world must be as the proposi­
tion says it is. And this must take the form of one or more concrete 
objects having properties or standing in relations (or failing to do so); 
no situation involving merely abstract entities can m ake a contingent prop­
osition true. (p. 195, emphasis added)
I have chosen to include both of these quotations in their entirety for the 
following reason: I have great difficultly understanding how we are to rec­
oncile the appeal to non-existent crows in the former quotation with the 
subsequent requirement that truths be grounded in concrete objects.
I imagine that we are all agreed that there are no non-existent crows. 
In his treatment of Molinism in chapter seven, Hasker considers God's 
knowledge of the counterfactuals of freedom pertaining to possible, non­
actual creatures. He writes, "Since there are no creatures that don't exist, 
this knowledge strictly speaking concerns uninstantiated essences" (p. 163, 
fn. 7). These essences, uninstantiated or instantiated, are presumably what 
Hasker intends to exclude by insisting upon the concrete nature of the 
states or events that ground contingent truths. Why, then, is it acceptable 
to appeal to the non-existence of some concrete state or event? What is it for 
a concrete event to fa il  to exist?
The problem here is not a new one. In "A World of States of Affairs," 
David Armstrong refers to the "vexed question whether or not to ad­
mit negative states of affairs."16 In Herbert Hochberg's review of Arm­
strong's book by the same title, he finds fault with Armstrong's attempt to 
"ground true negations by positive facts" (p. 482).17 Hochberg concludes 
that Armstrong implicitly relies upon "categorical properties, or 'quid­
dities'" (p. 482). The message is clear: grounding negative and universal 
truths in concrete events or states of affairs is no simple task. It is possible 
that Hasker has an account whereby this can be done, but if so this ac­
count has not yet been given.
If Hasker's (GP) is true, then it seems likely that there can be no true 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. However, absent some account of 
how it is that concrete states or events can fa il  to exist, or how non-existent 
objects can stand in relations, it seems equally likely that there can be no 
true universal or negative facts. Yet there are true universal and negative 
facts. For this reason, I maintain that the Molinist need not be troubled 
by Hasker's Grounding Principle. In being unable to meet the require­
ments of this principle, counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are in good 
company.
Providence, Evil and the O penness o f  G od  is an impressive collection of es­
says covering a wide range of material. However, while the chapters are 
thematically unified, the structure of the work as a whole is a bit disap­
pointing. There is a great deal of overlap between the chapters, and little 
to no acknowledgement of, or reference to, material outside of any given 
chapter. This is, perhaps, to be expected from a collection of essays. How­
ever, it can be disorienting as a reader to be introduced, for example, to
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both the problem of evil and open theism in chapter nine, 138 pages into a 
detailed discussion of both themes.18 The appendix offers much that is new, 
bu t-g iven  the nature of an appendix—the arguments offered here are 
quite cursory. Every essay in this volume is undoubtedly worth reading, 
but I look forward to seeing the synthesis of these earlier essays with the 
newer material, rather than simply being given the essays themselves.
In a similar vein, some of the essays contained in this volume were 
originally directed at a more general audience. As such, Hasker occasion­
ally alludes to “technical problems" with formulating a criterion precisely, 
and "technical philosophical reasons" for terminology, in ways that the 
philosophical audience at which this volume is aimed will find unsatisfac­
tory (pp. 80, 103, fn13).
These quibbles aside, there is much to recommend in Providence, Evil 
and the Openness o f God. "The freedom and goodness of God," is new to this 
volume and, I think, one of the most interesting and thought-provoking es­
says here. Additionally, the appendix contains a great deal of new material 
that any reader is sure to find challenging and insightful. The remaining 
chapters may not contain much that is new, but they are certainly replete 
with arguments, illustrations and assertions that will undoubtedly provoke 
continued (perhaps heated) discussion among philosophers of religion.
NOTES
1. "In order to avoid use-mention confusions I will use 'P' to stand for 
the sentence which expresses the proposition that P, and 'P' as the name of the 
state of affairs such that P" (p. 20). I will follow Hasker's lead throughout this 
review.
2. He appeals to the following principle here: "A necessary condition of 
my coming-into existence is the coming-into existence of my body" (p. 11). 
Hasker notes that not everyone will accept this principle. (I myself am inclined 
to reject this principle, but will grant it for the purposes of this review.)
3. Indeed, Hasker notes that "even genetic identity is not sufficient: iden­
tical twins are not identical persons" (p. 11).
4. Of course, as Hasker notes, I do not technically know that these atroci­
ties were necessary for my own coming-into existence. Still, I have no reason 
to believe that I would have existed had these atrocities not occurred. Thus, 
Hasker writes, "What I have no reason to suppose true must for practical pur­
poses be disregarded" (p. 15).
5. This may be too presumptuous; really, I think that most people should 
not be glad on the whole of their own existence. I cannot, and I'd like to think 
that most people—upon reflection—would find themselves in a similar situa­
tion. However, because the reflections must be conducted from the first-person 
perspective, I cannot be certain of how others will respond.
6. The Holocaust is surely an inflammatory example, but I believe it to be 
a fair one as well. In my own case, I am fairly confident that the Holocaust was 
necessary for my own existence. It seems plausible that, had Hitler's actions 
been less atrocious, the US would not have entered into WWII. Prior to WWII, 
my maternal grandfather was engaged to marry a woman who is decidedly 
not my grandmother. When he went to war, she married someone else. So, for 
me at least, the odds of having come into existence absent the Holocaust are 
not so good. Nevertheless, I am not the slightest bit inclined to prefer the oc­
currence of the Holocaust to its non-occurrence, despite the fact that I am very 
happy to be alive.
7. Eleonore Stump, “The Problem of Evil," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985), 
pp. 392-423.
8. John Hick, Evil and the God o f Love (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 
1996; revised edition 1978).
9. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," in The Evidential 
Argument from Evil, ed. Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1996).
10. Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem o f Evil (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1994).
11. William Rowe, “The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom" in 
Reasoned Faith, ed. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 
pp 223-33. See also “The Problem of No Best World," Faith and Philosophy 11:2 
(April 1994), pp 269-71; and “Can God Be Free?" Faith and Philosophy 19:4 (Oc­
tober 2002) pp. 405-24; Thomas Morris, “Perfection and Creation" in Reasoned 
Faith, ed. Eleonore Stump, pp. 234-47.
12. For example, in “The God Who Takes Risks" (Chap. 8) Hasker assumes 
that Molinism cannot address the grounding objection and so does not take it 
to be a viable alternative to Open Theism. He thus concludes, contra Molin- 
ism, that any theistic account according to which creatures are endowed with 
libertarian freedom will be an account on which God takes risks (pp. 125-26). 
In Chap. 10, “Antinomies of Divine Providence," Hasker grants that Molin- 
ism, as opposed to Open Theism and Theological Determinism, is initially in 
the best position to reconcile divine sovereignty with creaturely freedom. He 
again rejects Molinism on the basis of the Grounding Objection (pp. 153-58).
13. Briefly stated, the objection runs as follows: “Molinism might do a great 
job of balancing the freedom of creatures with the sovereignty of God, but it 
simply cannot be true. God cannot have Middle Knowledge; He cannot know 
which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are the true ones, because there 
are no such truths. There is nothing in virtue of which these counterfactuals 
could be true; they are groundless, and as such are neither true nor false." In 
the interest of space, and given the scope of this review, I will operate on the 
assumption that the reader is familiar with the relevant background material 
here. I refer the reader to Thomas Flint's Divine Providence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1998) for an accessible yet comprehensive account and de­
fense of Molinism.
14. Hasker defends (a) the limitation of this principle to contingent propo­
sitions, and (b) the insistence upon occurrent properties, entailed by his defini­
tion of concrete events, on page 195.
15. It is also important to note, as Hasker does, that “existence" here is to 
be taken trans-temporally (p. 195).
16. Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 7, Language and Logic (1993), pp. 429-40 at 
436.
17. D. M Armstrong, A World o f States o f Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997); Herbert Hochberg, “D. M Armstrong, A World of 
States of Affairs," Nous 33:3 (1999), pp. 473-95.
18. A more dramatic example: chapter four is entitled “The necessity of 
gratuitous evil." There, Hasker defends the claim that God must allow for evil 
that is in some sense gratuitous; it is not possible for God only to allow for 
“just enough" evil to ensure some great good. Chapter five, “Can God permit 
'just enough' evil?" makes the very same claim and, oddly enough, does so as 
if the arguments of the previous chapter had not yet been raised.
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